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‘Things’ Are Not What They Seem: On Persons, Things, Slaves and the New 
Abolitionist Movement 
‘Human trafficking’ emerged as a focus of political and media concern in the 1990s 
against a backcloth of rapid changes to an established global economic and political 
order. For governmental actors, ‘trafficking’ was part of a much wider problem of 
criminal involvement in an array of illegal markets and forms of movement. It was 
therefore bundled up with phenomena such as people smuggling, money laundering, 
and drug and gun running, and addressed within the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and its three additional protocols: the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol 
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The definition of 
‘trafficking’ in the latter protocol is extremely loose. ‘Trafficking’ is defined not as a 
single, one-off event, but a coercive process that takes place over time (recruitment, 
transportation and control) and that is organised – in a variety of different ways - for 
purposes of exploitation. ‘Exploitation’ is undefined, and the nature and degree of 
force that will constitute ‘coercion’ unspecified. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the vagueness of the term, political and media 
interest in ‘trafficking’ helped to support a resurgence of the anti-slavery movement 
in Western liberal countries, for although slavery is noted as just one possible 
outcome of ‘trafficking’ in the Trafficking Protocol, antislavery activists claimed 
‘trafficking’ as a form of ‘modern-day slavery’. Talk of ‘trafficking’ as an immense and 
growing global social problem has thus been translated into talk of slavery as a 
significant global problem, and a series of new non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have sprung up since the millennium with a mission to combat it. This 
includes Free the Slaves, founded in 2000, Stop the Traffik, founded in 2006, Not For 
Sale, founded in 2007, CNN Freedom Project, founded in 2011, and the Walk Free 
Foundation, founded in 2012, and many more. These ‘new abolitionist’ organisations 
draw upon the iconography of the original European and American abolitionist 
movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in their campaign materials, 
and also borrow some of their campaigning tactics. They urge members of the public 
to participate in a movement to combat ‘human trafficking’ and ‘modern slavery’ by 
boycotting ‘slave made’ goods, for instance, and call on them to raise money to 
support anti-slavery organisations and projects, as well as to sign petitions and 
otherwise press their governments to act against the problem of ‘modern slavery’ 
both domestically and globally.  
There is one very notable contrast between the old and new abolitionism, however. 
Historically, antislavery activists had to pit themselves against strong opposition 
from established political and economic powers, and in some cases, even broke the 
law in order to protect fugitive slaves from being returned to their masters, or to 
operate an ‘underground railway’ by means of which people could escape slavery. 
Today, the relationship between new abolitionist organisations and political and 
business elites in Europe, North America and also Australia is extremely cordial. The 
Walk Free Foundation was founded by mining magnate Andrew Forrest, Australia’s 
richest man, and endorsed by the then Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, as well as 
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political and business leaders from across the Western world, for example. Indeed, 
far from resisting the calls of new abolitionist NGOs, governments of the Western 
world have eagerly boarded today’s anti-slavery train. In the United States, January 
was designated ‘National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month’ from 
2012, and in February 2016, President Obama signed a bill that ended an exemption 
in the US Tariff Act of 1930 which had allowed ‘goods made by slaves to be imported 
if consumer demand cannot be met without them’. In 2013, the Australian 
Parliament passed two Acts with a view to enhancing the country’s legislative 
frameworks around human trafficking and slavery, and in 2015, the Modern Slavery 
Act, which consolidated existing trafficking and slavery offences, passed into law in 
England and Wales.1  
All such measures have been introduced with much fanfare trumpeting the deep 
revulsion felt by government ministers for ‘the scourge of modern-day slavery’, their 
absolute commitment to combatting it, and their gratitude to new abolitionist NGOs 
for, in Malcolm Turnbull’s words, educating the populace ‘about slavery and 
providing ways in which they can take action’.2 And far from questioning the nature 
and meaning of governments’ commitment to the cause, or the measures they are 
enacting in the name of fighting ‘trafficking’ and ‘slavery’, new abolitionist 
organisations generally return the compliments. So, for example, Nick Grono, head 
of the Freedom Fund, a private donor fund dedicated to ending slavery, recently 
welcomed unreservedly the following words from British Prime Minister Theresa 
May:  
These crimes must be stopped and the victims of modern slavery must go free. 
This is the great human rights issue of our time, and as Prime Minister I am 
determined that we will make it a national and international mission to rid our 
world of this barbaric evil.3 
But in a world where chattel slavery has already been outlawed everywhere, so that 
nobody, anywhere, is legally ascribed the status of ‘slave’, what exactly do new 
abolitionist campaigners and their political supporters mean by the term ‘modern 
slavery’, and how are ‘slaves’ and ‘slaveholders’ to be identified? This article 
explores new abolitionist efforts to define ‘slavery’, observing that they follow a 
tradition of liberal thought in which the singular wrong of slavery is held to be that it 
converts persons into things,4 an assumption that has also informed one strand of 
the historical literature on slavery in the Atlantic World. It then considers another 
strand of slavery scholarship, as well as some historical evidence, that alerts us to 
serious flaws in accounts that frame slavery through reference to the conceptual 
opposition of persons and things. In reality, Atlantic World slaves had a ‘bifurcated 
existence’ as both ‘things’ and ‘persons’, as Saidiya Hartman puts it.5 The article asks 
what closer attention to the history of the slave’s double character might teach us 
about serious and heavy restraints on freedom in the contemporary world.  
Defining Slavery? 
We live in a highly unequal world, and the lot of vast swathes of its population is 
grim. According to the United Nations, 780 million people do not have access to 
clean water, and 2.5 billion do not have access to adequate sanitation; the World 
Food Programme estimates that 795 million do not have enough food to lead an 
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active, healthy life; the World Health Organization states that under-five mortality 
rate in low-income countries was approximately 11 times the average rate in high-
income countries in 2015; the number of people forcibly displaced is at an all time 
high, 59.5 million at the end of 2014, compared to 37.5 million ten years previously, 
the UNHCR reports.6 To this we might add that vast numbers of the world’s women 
live in countries where they have no legal protection against marital rape and no 
access to divorce; vast numbers of lives are blighted or cut short by inequalities 
structured along lines of race or caste; vast numbers of workers, especially migrant 
workers, lack legal rights and protections as workers; vast numbers of migrants, 
especially internal migrants in India and China and undocumented migrants 
everywhere in the world, are denied basic social rights, and many hundreds of 
thousands of them are deprived of their liberty through immigration detention.7 This 
by no means completes the catalogue of human misery in the world around us. 
Contemporary anti-slavery actors draw a strong distinction between what they 
regard as more general forms of misery, drudgery, and oppression, and what they 
describe as real slavery. So, for example, Free the Slaves states that: ‘Free the Slaves 
believes that all labor abuses and human rights abuses are wrong. Our mission, 
however, is ending slavery’. Such a mission presupposes that ‘modern slavery’ 
constitutes a uniquely intolerable moral wrong, and that it can be separated from 
other social and global ills for purposes of practical intervention, as well as for 
purposes of measurement. How? At the level of rhetoric, the problem is addressed 
through a focus on particularly shocking and sensational individual cases of 
exploitation, abuse and violence, often those which have been discovered and 
prosecuted, and are therefore well documented. Books human trafficking and 
modern slavery typically open with an example in which the violence against an 
individual trapped as a domestic or brothel worker is so extreme as to suggest the 
perpetrator was actively motivated by a desire to obliterate and destroy the 
humanity of the victim. So, for instance, a recent book on human trafficking and 
slavery in America opens with the case of a twelve year-old Mexican girl, Maria, 
recruited into domestic work in Texas but then horrifically tortured for several 
months by her ‘employer’.8 The violence in this case was so extreme (the child was 
chained, starved, raped, pepper-sprayed and forced to eat dog excrement) as to 
suggest the perpetrator either could not see, or was actively motivated by a desire 
to obliterate and destroy, the humanity of her victim. By using such cases to 
introduce the topic of ‘modern slavery’, the authors make it very clear that they are 
not using the term to refer merely to grinding chores or workaday miseries, but 
something far, far worse, something akin to torture. ‘I'm talking about real slavery’, 
says Kevin Bales, co-founder of Free the Slaves and a key figure in the new 
abolitionist movement, ‘This is not about lousy marriages, this is not about jobs that 
suck’.9  
The use of dramatically brutal examples at the outset of campaigning books, articles 
and talks creates the impression that all those subsequently referred to as ‘slaves’ 
are subject to violence of a similarly extraordinary type and degree. However, the 
estimates of the scale of the problem provided by new abolitionist organizations are 
not exclusively based upon closely documented cases of this sort. Rather, they rely 
heavily on estimates of people believed to be affected by various categories that, for 
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purposes of quantification, are taken as proxies for slavery. The Walk Free 
Foundation recently published its third Global Slavery Index (GSI), for instance, 
announcing that there are currently some 45.8 million ‘slaves’ in the contemporary 
world. The index is compiled primarily by totting up estimates of the numbers of 
people thought to be affected by ‘human trafficking’, ‘forced labour’, ‘bonded 
labour’, ‘worst forms of child labour’, and ‘forced and early marriage’, for these are 
other names for ‘slavery’ in the contemporary world, according to Walk Free.  
These categories all present their own problems of definition, not least because they 
open up difficult questions about where precisely the line is to be drawn between 
them, and associated phenomena. Exploitation and abuse ranges along a continuum. 
At what point on that continuum does labour become forced labour, or debt become 
debt slavery, or marriage become forced marriage, and so on? Few would wish to set 
the bar so high that only those subject to violence and abuse amounting to 
prolonged torture such as that suffered by Maria would be included, but how far 
should the bar be lowered? Those collecting data on phenomena such as ‘bonded 
labour’ or ‘trafficking’ do not all agree. Indeed, for a number of reasons, data 
produced by different agencies, in different countries, and for different reasons, are 
not necessarily comparable. Matters are further complicated by the fact that even in 
theory, the categories taken as proxies for slavery are not mutually exclusive (the 
same person could be counted as a ‘victim of trafficking’, subject to ‘forced labour’, a 
‘bonded labourer’, and a child in a ‘worst form of child labour’, for example), so that 
totalling estimates of individuals affected by such phenomena is liable to involve 
double or even triple or quadruple counting.  
Leaving aside technical questions about the reliability of the GSI, Walk Free’s 
ambition to count and agitate on behalf of ‘modern slaves’ raises more fundamental 
questions about who qualifies for the appellation ‘slave’ and why. According to Walk 
Free and other new abolitionist NGOs, though ‘slavery’ takes many forms and 
‘slaves’ are found in very different contexts and settings, there is a common 
denominator: the people they call slaves are trapped in appalling situations from 
which they ‘cannot walk away’. This formula is a distillation of the definition of 
‘slavery’ offered by Kevin Bales, who holds that although slavery has taken many 
forms throughout human history, it is possible to parse out three essential, universal 
features of slavery that are found in all its different manifestations across time and 
geography. Slavery, Bales says, is characterised first by involuntariness – the slave 
did not chose and cannot escape her situation; second, by severe exploitation; and 
third, by violence or its threat, including psychological violence. Attention to these 
three core features allows us to draw the line between true slavery and other, more 
ordinary ills and injustices, Bales argues, for it is only when individuals are ‘controlled 
by violence through violence, the threat of violence, or psychological coercion, has 
lost free will and free movement, is exploited economically, and paid nothing 
beyond subsistence’ that they become slaves.10 This boils down to being unable to 
‘walk away’, which in effect amounts to becoming an object of ownership. Bales 
returns to the definition of slavery in the League of Nations’ 1926 Slavery Convention 
as 'the status of a person over whom all or any of the rights attaching to ownership 
are exercised', and fleshes it out by stating that ‘powers attaching to the right of 
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ownership’ imply the right to possess, and that possession is demonstrated by 
control, normally exclusive control, and by: 
The right to use; the right to manage; the right to income… [and] the right to 
capital, which refers to the right to dispose of the possession, by transfer, by 
consumption, or by destruction. These ‘instances of ownership’ – control, use, 
management, and profit – may be regarded as the central rights of ownership. 
It is their presence and exercise that can be applied and tested within a 
situation, such as slavery, where actual legal possession is not permitted.11 
The League of Nations’ definition is thus said to apply not only in de jure situations in 
which a person is legally owned by another, but also in de facto situations where 
legal ownership is prohibited, but the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised nonetheless. If one person exercises complete powers of control over 
another, they in effect make them a chattel. Thus, the 2012 Bellagio-Harvard 
Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, authored by Bales and others in the 
Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, states that ownership implies 
a background relation of control, control is the power attaching to the right of 
ownership known as possession, and: ‘Possession is foundational to an 
understanding of the legal definition of slavery, even when the State does not 
support a property right in respect of persons. To determine, in law, a case of 
slavery, one must look for possession’.12 And in essence, possession ‘supposes 
control over a person by another such as a person might control a thing’.13 For 
today’s antislavery activists, like many of their forebears in the Euro-American 
antislavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is this 
reduction of persons to things that both defines slavery and makes it uniquely 
wrong. Human beings are ‘Not for Sale’, as the name of David Batstone’s antislavery 
NGO proclaims.  
These efforts to pin down the essential characteristics and peculiar wrongs of slavery 
certainly fit with commonsense understandings of enslavement in contemporary 
liberal democratic societies, and with much British and US historiography of 
transatlantic slavery. As Nicholas Rinehart observes, ‘It has become something of a 
truism, or a conclusion to be taken for granted… that… in the Atlantic slave trade and 
the internal slave trades of the New World… persons were made into things. This… 
often expressed itself in terms of the “commodification” or “dehumanization” of 
enslaved people’.14 However, the emphasis on slavery as the reduction of persons to 
things does not actually sit easily with historical evidence on slavery in the Atlantic 
world.  
Slavery and De Facto Freedoms in the Atlantic World 
If involuntariness (in the sense of being unable to walk away), severe labour 
exploitation, and violence or its threat constituted the defining and essential 
elements of slavery, we would expect to find that every single person legally 
ascribed the status of slave experienced those elements throughout the entirety of 
her or his enslavement. These three features certainly may appear to broadly 
capture the situation of field slaves on large plantations of the American South, 
Brazil, and the West Indies in the nineteenth century, but there were significant 
variations between colonial slave regimes in North America, Latin America and the 
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Caribbean in terms of legal and social practices surrounding slavery,15 as well as 
major chronological and geographical variations in terms of the history of plantation 
slavery in the Atlantic world. At different times and in different places, significant 
numbers of the enslaved population were in the hands of small-scale farmers or 
homesteaders,16 and in some contexts this implied working unsupervised for much 
of the time. Significant numbers of enslaved people also lived and worked in cities 
and towns where they performed much of the skilled, as well as the unskilled, work, 
and again, were not necessarily always or continuously under the close watch of the 
owner or owner’s agent.17 Many slaves were hired out, and a few highly skilled 
slaves were even in effect leased to themselves, being expected to seek out their 
own paid work, manage their own subsistence, and pay a percentage of their wages 
to their owner.  
No matter what the period or context, it was rarely in slaveholders’ interests to keep 
every slave securely shackled or weighted down by ball and chain. In order to fully 
exploit their labour power, they needed slaves to be able to move around and 
between plantations, farms and/or towns and cities. At many times and in many 
places, it was also advantageous to slaveholders to allow their slaves a certain 
amount of freedom of movement so that they could secure their own subsistence by 
hunting in woods or swamps, or labouring unsupervised on their own provision 
plots, or working for wages on Sundays and using their earnings to purchase 
necessities, for example. For this reason, even the mobility of slaves on large 
plantations was not always continuously and entirely restricted.18 Though limited, 
the freedom of mobility that was allowed the enslaved frequently provided 
possibilities for escape. And many thousands of slaves availed themselves of those 
opportunities, running away to live as maroons or making their way to freedom in 
Canada, Mexico, or elsewhere.19  
The use of slaves as soldiers offers another case strikingly at odds with 
contemporary, commonsense ideas about slavery. Not only were some slaves armed 
to fight on the patriot side of the American Revolutionary war, but when the theatre 
of that war spread to the Caribbean, the British armed thousands of slaves to fight 
for them. Until 1807, the British West India Regiment, founded in 1795, relied 
heavily on slave conscripts, predominantly those newly transported from Africa, who 
were uniformed and armed and paid a wage. Slave-soldiers were certainly controlled 
by means of violence or its threat – punishments for attempts to escape or mutiny, 
and even for minor misdemeanours, were barbaric. But the same punishments were 
administered to non-slave soldiers. Equally troubling for those who take violent 
control as marking the line between slave and non-slave, slave-soldiers were 
sometimes deployed in actions to violently supress revolts on the part of other 
slaves.20 
More generally, it was not uncommon for enslaved people to be entrusted with 
managerial roles in relation to other slaves, or even entire estates, and though most 
undertook supervisory roles on behalf of their owners, there were also some slaves 
who enjoyed de facto ownership of other slaves, of which more below.21 There were 
also some slaveholders who allowed certain favoured slaves to live as if they were 
free. In the French Caribbean, female slaves in particular sometimes managed to 
secure what Bernard Moitt describes as ‘de facto manumission’ for themselves 
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and/or their children through sexual relationships with white men.22 Known as libre 
de savane or libre de fait, these were de jure slaves (their manumission was not 
authorized by the state and so had no legal basis) who were not in fact ‘possessed’ in 
the manner taken by the new abolitionists to be constitutive of slavery. If Bales, for 
example, is correct to that that slavery is defined by the presence and exercise of the 
central rights of ownership, which he defines as ‘control, use, management, and 
profit’, then some de jure slaves of the Atlantic World fall short of being ‘slaves’.  
However, whilst de jure slaves could experience certain de facto freedoms, the 
writings of freed and fugitive slaves, alongside other historical evidence, suggests 
that even the most privileged of the enslaved did not regard de facto freedom as 
equivalent to de jure freedom. Those who were libre de fait in the French Caribbean 
frequently made strenuous efforts to secure full legal manumission,23 and they were 
not alone in this. The Petition of Ned Hyman and Elizabeth Hagans to the North 
Carolina General Assembly 24in 1833 offers an insight into their motivations, as well 
as a particularly striking illustration of the complexities discussed thus far. Ned 
Hyman, an enslaved man, and Elizabeth Hagans, a free woman of colour, were 
married and had three children together. But in addition to being Hyman’s wife, 
Hagans was also his legal owner. Hyman’s orginal Master had died, and his executor 
had – at Hyman’s request – sold him to Hagans. The two subsequently had ‘the good 
fortune to accumulate an estate worth from five to six thousand dollars’. Some of 
that wealth was in money, land and live stock. But it was also in ‘negroes’. Hyman 
was a de jure slave who exercised de facto powers of ownership over other de jure 
slaves.  
Ned Hyman does not appear to have experienced any of the three conditions Bales 
identifies as forming the core of slavery. His petition suggests that he was not 
involuntarily bound to his owner. Given the fondness it expresses towards Elizabeth 
Hagans, it seems safe to assume that she did not control him by means of violence or 
its threat. Nor did she subject him to severe economic exploitation. Instead, they 
worked together to accumulate wealth, including by exploiting the labour of chattel 
slaves. Hyman seems to have lived as close a mimicry of free status as would be 
possible in a slave state, but he nonetheless went to the trouble and expense of 
petitioning for legal manumission. The right and title to the ‘lands… live stock 
negroes’ were vested in Hagans, and should she die, or experience a ‘change in her 
feelings or disposition’ towards him, he said, he ‘might not only lose his whole estate 
but even that portion of freedom and happiness, which by the kindness of his wife 
he is now permitted to enjoy’. De facto freedom was precarious, and so a poor 
substitute for de jure freedom. Even at its most expansive, it could not liberate the 
slave from dependency on the de jure owner or disentangle their fates.    
The less expansive de facto freedoms that, in theory, often made it possible to walk 
(or run) away from an owner were still more hollow. To act on those freedoms was 
to face risks emanating not only or necessarily from the physical power of the 
individual slaveholder (who may in fact have been relatively physically powerless – 
the elderly and disabled also owned slaves, for example) but also from the wider 
legal and social edifice that had been constructed to prevent slaves from choosing to 
grasp opportunities for escape. As a number of slave narratives reveal, the enslaved 
were walled into slavery by the fact they had nowhere and nothing to walk to, as 
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much as by physical chains, pens, cages and fences. Though many did flee to join 
strong and successful communities of maroons, or manage to escape the territory 
entirely, those who failed in the attempt faced torture and frequently mutilation. 
And even those who were successful almost all paid an immense price in the form of 
sacrificing all connection to family and loved ones left behind. Indeed, the latter 
operated as a powerful restraint even on those who could have escaped slavery 
without fear of recapture and punishment, as Edlie Wong’s research on American 
slaves who accompanied their owners on their travels to ‘free’ Northern states 
shows. Slaves who were taken by their owners onto territory in which slavery was 
not legally recognised could legally assert their freedom (if the slave escaped to that 
territory under her own steam, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required that she be 
returned to her owner). Knowing this, slaveholders wishing to travel North with 
slaves often made a point of selecting slaves with strong affective ties to children, 
partners or parents to accompany them, thereby reducing the likelihood that they 
would choose to claim their freedom.25 
The above considerations suggest that chattel slavery was not merely oppressive 
because it implied violence, severe labour exploitation, and an inability to walk away 
from an individual owner, but also because it was a legal, social and political status – 
given and policed by the state. ‘Slave’ was a status that enforced alienage, rendering 
any de facto freedom that might be enjoyed by an enslaved person insubstantial and 
vaporous. Something important is missing from new abolitionist understandings of 
slavery’s defining features and peculiar injustice.  
Persons and Things  
It is true that in the Atlantic World the enslaved were legally constructed as objects 
of property, and a precise specification of their monetary worth could be made for 
purposes of market exchange, mortgaging, insurance, and the valuation of estates. 
At those moments of exchange and accounting, they were represented in the 
manner of ‘things’.26 This aspect of slavery has preoccupied many historians, as well 
as many abolitionists old and new, who interpret evidence on the representation of 
slaves as ‘numbers’ or ‘pieces’ in official commercial documents of the slave trade as 
evidence of the commodification and so dehumanization of the enslaved. But as 
Rinehart points out, we not only need to bear in mind that these new modes of 
representation were most commonly found in Anglo-American markets and did not 
necessarily feature ‘in Iberians, Francophone, or even African contexts’, but also to 
remember that the representation of the enslaved as abstracted ‘things’ is not 
equivalent to the treatment of the enslaved as if they were inanimate objects.27 In 
the daily operation of the transatlantic slave trade and of slaveholding in slave 
societies, ‘the horrific practices of starvation, torture, and other forms of “psychic 
and social” violence enacted upon slaves reveal a profound investment in and 
acknowledgment of the humanity of enslaved people by their enslavers’, Rinehart 
argues. These practices would have been unnecessary if the representation of 
human beings as commodities did literally de-humanize them and transform them 
into mere objects or ‘things’.28  
The enslaved remained human beings, despite being transacted as property, and in 
fact had a utility beyond that of material tools and non-human animals precisely 
because they were human.29 Their humanity represented a problem as well as a 
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boon for slaveholders, however. Since the human will is inalienable, slaves had to be 
managed and controlled in such a way as to maximize the chances that they would 
subordinate their own will to that of their owners, and do their bidding. It is well 
known that violence, often extreme and sadistic, was one of the instruments 
deployed by slaveholders to terrify slaves into submission, but this could also 
provoke resistance, and Atlantic World slaveholders were, to varying degrees 
according to time and place as well as the individual slaveholder’s circumstances, 
dependent on the state to enforce their power over slaves. 
Giving the enslaved a legal personality was central to the way in which slave states 
met this challenge. Unlike the livestock to which they were routinely compared, 
slaves in the Atlantic world were arrested, tried, and punished for committing 
outlawed acts. And criminalized acts included any and all forms of refusal to submit 
to the authority of a master or any white person, any act of resistance against their 
violence, no matter how arbitrary or extreme, as well as any effort to escape.30 
Indeed, under the US Fugitive Slave Act 1850, the runaway slave was liable, as a 
person, for the crime of stealing herself, as a thing.31 At the heart of slavery as a 
system of domination was a body of law that gave the enslaved their ‘double 
character’ as both things and persons.32 ‘The body of the slave is both treated 
juridically as one who can be held legally culpable for crimes but is also an object to 
be owned by others’, as Brenna Bhandar puts it.33  
This seeming contradiction was a necessary and inescapable feature of slavery, 
reflecting slaveholders’ contradictory interests in the enslaved. On the one hand, 
they wished to exploit the enslaved as humans, with all that this implied in terms of 
the capacity to reason, plan, react, collaborate, create, and move. But on the other 
hand, they wished to prevent the enslaved from using these same qualities to 
escape, resist, or act collectively to ameliorate or transform the conditions under 
which they were constructed as objects of commodity exchange and property 
ownership. Slaveholders required a legal apparatus that ensured slaves were both 
immobile (lacking the ability to run away, and the capacity to alter their status and 
circumstances by dint of their own will and effort, in other words to be spatially and 
socially fixed) and mobile (such that it was possible to circulate slaves in markets and 
so that slaves could move around at the behest of their owners). It was also a 
necessary feature of slavery because legal ownership did not, and could not, actually 
allow slaveholders to literally appropriate the self and will of the slave and directly 
cause them act. Rather, as human beings endowed with will, the enslaved had to 
actively decide to whether or not to comply with orders given by their legal owners, 
and such compliance could ultimately only be assured by fabricating the enslaved as 
‘things’ with a legal personality.34  
Slaveholders and proslavery thinkers in the Atlantic world often sought to explain 
the compliance of the vast majority of the enslaved as a reflection of their 
dependency upon the Masters who housed, fed, and ‘cared’ for them, and there is 
evidence showing that in some cases, enslaved people’s choices were influenced by 
ideas about duty, obligation, loyalty, and honour (in other words, by their 
understandings of the relationship between master and slave as specifically 
human).35 However, even if we allow that there were cases in which individual slaves 
felt an attachment to individual slaveholders, their compliance must still be 
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understood in the context of the wider system of terror that constrained the choices 
of the enslaved as a whole. Slave codes and the punishments they provided made 
the alternative to compliance truly horrifying, and in this respect too, slave law was 
critically concerned with slaves as subjects, not objects. The threat of torture cannot 
induce non-human property to bend itself to the owner’s will. It follows that the 
control exercised by slaveholders over slaves was not control over them ‘such as a 
person might control a thing’, as new abolitionist commentators have it. No special 
measures are required to prevent silver cutlery from escaping the drawer in which it 
is kept, to terrorize gold bullion into surrendering its market value, or to prevent 
cows from learning to read, lest they happen upon animal rights literature and rise 
up against dairy farmers. In the case of slave property, by contrast, slaveholders’ 
enjoyment of their rights in the enslaved as property was only possible and 
sustainable with the support of a legal edifice that managed and contained the 
enslaved as persons.  
Economic and political life, or market and state, are mutually imbricated, David 
Graeber observes. The idea that they are separate is precisely that, an idea: ‘States 
created markets. Markets require states. Neither could continue without the other, 
at least, in anything like the forms we would recognize today’.36 This is also true of 
slave markets. The economic value of slaves both on the auction block and in 
processes of productive and reproductive labour (including the value derived from 
being able to use violence and torture to extract their labour and obedience, and 
from being able to simultaneously permit and prevent their movement) was minted 
and underwritten by the political authority of the state. Atlantic World slavery rested 
on a legal, social and political machinery, or rather upon various different legal, 
social and political machineries, that gave the enslaved their double life as persons 
and things. At base, these machineries worked by excluding the enslaved from the 
cover of what, at that time, constituted socially recognized personhood, by 
producing and reproducing them (usually also their children) as Outsiders and sub-
persons.37  
Slavery was more than just a relationship between slaveholder and slave. It also 
designated, in Stephen Best and Saidiya Hartman’s words, ‘a relation to law, state, 
and sovereign power; a condition of disfigured personhood, civil incapacitation, and 
bare life’.38 One central question for anyone interested in what the history of 
transatlantic slavery can teach us about relations of exploitation and heavy, often 
violent, restraints on freedom in the contemporary world should therefore be, ‘Who 
today stands in similar relation to law, state, and sovereign power?’  
The Disfiguration of Personhood Past and Present 
If slavery is approached as a condition of disfigured personhood, civil incapacitation 
and bare life (as opposed to a condition in which an individual is subject to any or all 
of the powers of ownership), a rather different picture of its living remnants and 
echoes in the contemporary world emerges to that drawn by organizations like Walk 
Free. To begin with, it focuses our attention on race, and very specific forms of anti-
black racism in the Americas and Europe. One social and political outcome of the 
transatlantic slave trade was that ‘slavery became indelibly linked throughout the 
Western Hemisphere with people of African descent… the dishonor, humiliation and 
bestialization that had universally been associated with chattel slavery now became 
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fused with Negritude’.39 Though the history of that fusion is more geographically and 
chronologically varied than sometimes assumed,40 it ultimately gave freedom, rights 
and citizenship an explicitly racial character, reserving them exclusively for those 
racialised as white. By the same token, as Bhandar argues, ‘the fact of blackness, the 
story of “negrosity” in the law’ was one in which those racialized as black were 
‘caught in the impossible position of being object of circulation and subject who is 
only recognized as such by the law in matters criminal’.41  
This did not end with the abolition of slavery. Blackness continued and continues to 
simultaneously cast doubt on fitness for freedom and citizenship, and to implicitly or 
explicitly suggest criminality in the post-abolition world. The US context has received 
most scholarly attention. As Dennis Childs points out, though widely regarded as the 
‘grandest emancipatory gesture in U.S. history’, the 13th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution that abolished chattel slavery in 1865 contained ‘a loophole of 
state repression’. It read: ‘"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction”’.42 This loophole 
was significant in the immediate aftermath of abolition, for amongst the measures 
that worked to strip newly emancipated slaves and their descendants of the rights to 
which their presumptive ‘freedom’ entitled them was the southern convict lease 
system, which ‘transferred symbolically significant numbers of black people from the 
prison of slavery to the slavery of prison’.43  
That loophole continues to be significant today, in the age of mass incarceration. 
America’s prison population had reached 2.3 million by 2009, two-thirds of whom 
were ‘people of colour’.44 Approximately half a million of these people are serving 
time for drug offences, mostly involving minor infractions of drug laws, such as 
possession of small quantities of marijuana,45 and almost five million people more 
‘are under direct state supervision through the parole and probation systems’.46 As 
Colin Dayan powerfully argues, these prisoners are stripped of the skin of civil 
personhood in ways redolent of slavery.47 But since they are not ‘owned’ either de 
jure or de facto by another individual, they are not present in the roll call of ‘modern 
slaves’ that new abolitionist campaigners wish to emancipate. The ‘afterlife’ of 
transatlantic slavery in the form of a system of racial domination that marks freedom 
as white and disfigures black personhood, devaluing and imperilling black lives, 
remains in play in the US and beyond.48 Indeed, police killings of black people, 
especially poor and young male black people, are even more numerous in Brazil than 
in the US;49 there is ‘greater disproportionality in the number of black people in 
prisons in the UK than in the United States’.50 Though the complex and enduring 
interrelationship ‘between the legal form of property and the racial… remains crucial 
to accounting for contemporary iterations of a globalized capital firmly rooted in 
histories of slavery and colonialism,’51 it is entirely absent from new abolitionist 
analyses of ‘modern slavery’. 
The question of who today stands in a similar relation to law, state, and sovereign 
power as did de jure slaves historically also directs attention towards the many 
groups of migrants who are, to varying degrees, legally disabled and excluded from 
the full cover what constitutes socially recognised personhood in the territory on 
which they stand, or across which they move. Consider the many thousands of 
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people currently stuck in makeshift camps at European borders, having sought to 
move across borders without state sanction. If they manage to cross the Turkish 
border without being shot by border guards, or survive perilous voyages across the 
Mediterranean or Aegean seas, such migrants (including those fleeing wars or forms 
of persecution that are recognised as legitimate grounds for claiming asylum) 
increasingly find themselves living for months or even years in flimsy tents and 
makeshift shelters, with no protection from assault, robbery or trickery, no access to 
health care, education, or justice, no right to sanitation, employment or livelihood. 
They are treated as extraneous to and excluded from any political order and any 
society other than that which they can build amongst themselves. However, like 
slaves historically, they are attributed a form of ‘negative personhood’.52 They 
continue to be held responsible for any criminalized acts they commit, even when it 
is necessary to invoke nineteenth century laws to criminalise them, as is the case for 
asylum seekers who have managed to walk through the Channel Tunnel to get the 
UK and who are being prosecuted under the 1861 Malicious Damage Act. In fact, at 
the point of destination as well as during periods of enforced immobility along the 
route, irregular migrants are increasingly criminalized for undertaking more or less 
any and all acts necessary to support life itself. To take employment or perform any 
kind of earning activity when illegally present on the state’s territory is widely 
outlawed, with the UK 2016 Immigration Act creating a new criminal offence of 
“illegal working” as well as for driving whilst not legally present in the UK. Measures 
to prevent unauthorized migrants from renting housing have been strengthened, 
and banks and building societies are required to conduct periodic immigration 
checks in relation to account holders and report disqualified persons.53  
At the same time, immigration detention is being used ever more widely in Britain, 
the US and Australia, where detainees have fewer rights even than those caught up 
in the penal system. Immigration detainees do not feature in new abolitionist 
organizations’ campaigns against ‘modern slavery’, yet they could be said to meet 
the criteria that these organizations state constitute ‘slavery’. Detainees did not 
choose and cannot ‘walk away’ from the situation they are in, and they are under 
the potential and actual violent control of those who hold them.54 Depriving non-
citizens of their liberty is an activity that generates significant profits for the many 
private companies involved in the provision of ‘security’ services and the 
construction and management of immigration detention centres. In the UK, the 
management of detention centres (as well as prisons) is increasingly being 
outsourced to global private security companies, such as G4S, Serco, and Sodexo.55 
Without bodies to hold and process, there would be no profit for these private 
companies to secure, and since immigration detainees function as the raw materials 
of this ‘labour process’, they are arguably subject to ‘severe economic exploitation’. 
Some immigration detainees are, in addition, subject to labour exploitation in the 
detention centre that holds them.56 A 2014 Corporate Watch report suggests that 
employing detainees at these well below minimum wage rates, Serco, G4S, and 
others could have saved themselves more than £2.8 million.57  
Migrants frequently speak of feeling degraded, dehumanized, dishonoured by their 
experience of detention, and release from it rarely spells anything like freedom. 
Sometimes it implies deportation, usually a form of forced movement across 
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borders, and one that can have deadly results.58 In the UK, immigration detainees 
are frequently released rather than deported, often due to the Home Office’s 
inability to complete the administrative procedures necessary for removal. Axel Klein 
and Lucy Williams have carefully documented the ways in which former detainees 
are reduced to civil death and the bare life of physical survival. Drawing on Dayan’s 
work, they observe that as with the laws of southern slave states that could 
simultaneously recognize slaves as willing selves as regards criminal culpability and 
as objects of property, former immigration detainees are affected by the disabling 
power ‘inherent in a legal action that invents a personality only to exclude it’.59  
In the eyes of the new abolitionists, the economic value extracted from immigration 
detainees, the state-authorized restraints on irregular migrants’ rights and freedoms, 
and the violence against them that is sponsored by liberal states, does not amount 
to ‘modern slavery’. Yet unlike many of those who are regarded as ‘slaves’ by the 
new abolitionists, those who are immobilized and outlawed by immigration law very 
often do compare their own situation to that of enslavement. Echoing an antislavery 
rhetoric in which slavery was described as animalizing the enslaved,60 the statement 
“We are not animals” repeatedly appears in migrants’ protests against the 
conditions in which they are kept. In a recent open letter, six hundred asylum 
seekers held at the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre even called on the 
Australian Government to execute them rather than force them to continue 
indefinitely to experience ‘gradual death’ on the island.61 The previous week, those 
stranded on Greece’s northern border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia by the introduction of a policy granting passage only to people from 
Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, also staged hunger strikes and other protests. A group of 
Bangladeshi men involved in the protest had slogans written in red paint on their 
bared chests – “Shoot us or save us”, read one.62 The migrants calling on liberal 
democratic states to either recognise them as full and rights-bearing persons or kill 
them as wild beasts remind us that, between the seemingly sharp contrast of pre-
modern despots and slaveholders who ‘let live and made die’, and modern states 
that ‘make live and let die’, lies the sovereign power to impose living death on 
certain categories of human being. This is a power that our modern, liberal, 
‘humane’ governments are continuing to exercise.63 It is not one that is challenged 
by new abolitionist campaigners, who only countenance the possibility that people 
can be ‘slaves’ of the state where the state concerned is a totalitarian one, such as 
North Korea. 
To all of this it should be added that migrants who enter the territory with the 
authorization of the state are also often denied fully socially recognised personhood. 
Indeed, the very terms on which migrants are permitted to enter and work, or 
marry, often require them to relinquish claims to rights and freedoms that are 
regarded as fundamental to the free citizen. In many countries, sponsorship is 
required for certain types of visa to be granted, and the migrant is thereby made 
dependent on the sponsor for her or his right to remain on the territory. This 
severely compromises migrants’ freedom to ‘walk away’ since quitting an employer, 
or separating from or divorcing a spouse, for example, will have serious implications 
for their immigration status.64 These restrictions on freedom actively produce 
vulnerability to control by other persons. The balance of power is heavily weighted 
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towards the sponsor, whether employer or spouse, under immigration rules that 
present migrants with a choice between remaining with their sponsor, no matter 
how exploitative or violent, or ‘walking away’, when quitting either means being 
returned home unable to repay debts taken on to fund migration, or becoming 
‘illegal’ and so vulnerable to all the forms of violence and exclusion noted above.  
The Configuration of ‘Things’ Past and Present 
The fact that Atlantic World slaves could be simultaneously represented as 
commodities and controlled and subjugated as human beings should remind us that 
commodities (or ‘things’) do not exist as commodities (or ‘things’), any more than 
‘persons’ simply exist as ‘persons’ – they have to be socially imagined and politically 
constructed. As Igor Kopytoff’s classic discussion of the cultural biography of things 
highlighted, commoditization is a social process through which something (whether 
material object, animal, human capacity, or whole human being) comes to be 
conceptually marked as exchangeable or saleable for money as opposed to 
‘incomparable, unique, singular and therefore not exchangeable for anything else’.65 
What is regarded in this light varies across cultures and through history – hence in 
modern, liberal societies (some) human beings were regarded as saleable 
commodities two hundred years ago, but are not so regarded in the same societies 
today. More importantly for the purposes of this essay, however, the commodity 
status of a given ‘thing’ in a given society and historical period can also change over 
time as it is invested with, or divested of, other social meanings. A gold ring may be a 
commodity when purchased, but becomes singular and non-exchangeable when 
used as a wedding ring; a puppy may be a commodity when advertised for sale by a 
dog breeder, but ceases to imagined as such once it becomes a family pet. And as 
Kopytoff noted, the ‘career’ of a slave involved a process of ‘commoditization, 
followed by increased singularization (or decommoditization) in the new setting, 
with the possibility of later recommoditization’.66  
Rinehart has flagged up the importance of Kopytoff’s emphasis on commodity-as-
process for historians of slavery, arguing that this model ‘is best suited to our field of 
inquiry because it reflects the lived experience of enslavement itself’, allowing us to 
better ‘understand how “slavery” varied so widely across time and space’ as well as 
to grasp the processual nature of enslavement for individual slaves – ‘not just in the 
sense of bondage and freedom, life and death, being and nonbeing… [but also] with 
respect to the multiple slaveries endured by any single man or woman throughout a 
lifetime’.67 A processual approach to commodification also allows us to identify 
certain similarities between slavery and wage labour that are important for the 
analysis of some of the contemporary phenomena discussed under the heading of 
‘modern slavery’. 
The human capacity to labour is conceptually marked as a commodity in modern 
capitalist societies in the sense that we speak of ‘labour markets’ and workers selling 
their labour to employers. In liberal thought, the wage labour exchange is entirely 
unlike slavery, since it is said to entail a voluntary covenant by which the worker 
contracts to alienate the property she holds in her own labour in exchange for an 
agreed sum. However, as Marx observed, labour power exists only in the living self 
of the worker, it cannot be separated from the person who sells it.68 The worker can 
go to market to sell her labour as though it is a commodity, and yet must also ‘be 
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present when the commodity she has parted with is consumed by its purchaser’.69 
The contract between buyer and seller in the labour market is therefore unlike the 
contracts that facilitate most other market exchanges. It involves a transfer of 
powers over persons, not the exchange of one ‘thing’ (money) for another (labour), 
since when employers purchase workers’ power to labour, what they wish to obtain 
is the right to direct workers to do their bidding for the period of the contract. Thus, 
though worker and employer meet as equals in the market, each bearing her or his 
commodity and voluntarily agreeing to a contractual exchange, the two parties then 
leave the marketplace and move to the private arena of the workplace, what Marx 
called the ‘hidden abode of production’.70 In this location, wage labour – which was 
free whilst circulating in the market - becomes unfree in the sense that, ‘Once 
labour-power becomes the property of capitalists, the labourers are subject to 
discipline and supervision’.71 Or following Kopytoff’s remarks on the career of a 
slave, we might say that the career of the worker involves a process of 
commoditization in the labour market, followed by decommoditization in the 
workplace, with the possibility of later recommoditization. 
The fact that employment, unlike Atlantic World slavery, begins with a voluntary 
contract is no guarantee of equality or rights in the private sphere of production. In 
principle, it licenses employers to exercise (albeit temporarily) the right of command 
in relation to the worker that the slaveholder enjoys in relation to the slave – ‘In the 
factory code, the capitalist formulates his autocratic power over his workers like a 
private legislator, and purely as an emanation of his own will’, as Marx put it.72 A 
new abolitionist might object that the slaveholder’s power of command differs 
because it is unlimited both temporally and physically - the slave cannot walk away. 
It is certainly true that contract can impose strong limits on employers’ freedom to 
treat workers as they please. But it is equally true that labour contracts can bestow 
almost unlimited powers on employers, and for extremely protracted periods of 
time. This is amply demonstrated by the history of European indentured servants to 
the early American colonies, whose contracts of indenture generally bound them to 
a master for periods of between 3 and 7 years. Though many entered these 
contracts voluntarily, they could not quit and their independent mobility was 
criminalized for the duration.73 To this we might add that the trade in supplying 
servants was, like the transatlantic slave trade, a profitable business, with private 
shipping firms arranging the movement of indentured servants (also convicts) and 
selling them to the highest bidder in America, ‘with the monies received going to 
defray the shippers’ transportation expenses’.74 Moreover, ‘a remarkably fluid 
internal market for bound workers’ developed in America, with servants being 
rented out and sold on to new masters and mistresses.75 
Or consider Masters and Servants’ legislation, which in England was not repealed 
until 1875 and which came to cover factory workers as well as agricultural and 
domestic workers. It made worker absence and desertion, as well as 
insubordination, unsatisfactory work, and damaging property, punishable by 
imprisonment ‘usually for three months, with perpetual re-imprisonment possible if 
the servant refused to go back to work’.76 The coding of employment relations as 
master and servant, Yan Hairong notes, ‘stressed that the employer-master has 
legally sanctioned property in the service of the servant-employee… the contract has 
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built-in legal relations of subjection’.77 Few workers in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries could freely walk away from a master, and not simply because 
to do so might imply destitution and starvation, but also because they were legally 
bound to him. This points to another problem with the new abolitionist definition of 
‘slavery’, namely that applied retrospectively, it would make the vast bulk of wage 
labourers in industrializing Europe and North America ‘modern slaves’. And ‘the 
regime of contract rules we refer to as modern free labor… must be seen as a 
product of labor’s struggle to improve its position in a market society’,78 not a 
product of anti-slavery activism. 
Struggles over the kind of power relations that contract can legitimately initiate were 
connected to wider political struggles over the background structures of the social 
order that lead people to enter into labour contracts in the first place. Class struggle 
was not merely an effort to ensure that workers got paid for their backbreaking 
work, were protected from employer violence, and enjoyed the formal right to freely 
retract from labour contracts. It was also a struggle for social and economic rights - 
for freedom from dependency on the market, as well as from dependence on 
individual employers. The success of the labour movement’s insistence that ‘labour 
is not a commodity’ and its calls for recognition and protection of the human worth 
of the worker as bearer of this commodified-non-commodity reached its pinnacle in 
the political settlement that became the norm in welfare capitalist states in the post-
world-war-2 period. This settlement entailed state intervention in the market 
exchange processes of a capitalist economy by providing social security payments 
and public services that, to a greater or lesser degree, insulated individuals and 
families from complete dependence on the labour market for their survival.79 
Welfare states also penetrated the ‘hidden abode’ of production, intervening to 
moderate and monitor workplace relations and practices, adopting policies that 
afforded (some) workers certain forms of protection in employment as well as from 
the market and that eroded the employment-at-will rule.80 The aim was to ensure 
the capitalist no longer enjoyed the liberty to formulate his autocratic power over 
his workers purely as an emanation of his own will, but was constrained by 
legislation that afforded workers’ minimum labour rights and standards. This was a 
regime within which the human capacity to labour could be sold on a labour market 
without coming to look like a ‘thing’ over which the buyer could exercise powers of 
ownership. 
This basic model of ‘worker citizenship’ was internationalised by the International 
Labour Organization, and adopted in many developing countries.81 It is, however, 
important to note that even in the heyday of welfare capitalism and in the most 
affluent countries, not every human being benefited equally from this model. 
Worker citizenship was both gendered and raced, leaving those who were not white, 
and/or not men, standing more precariously both as workers and as citizens.82 
Meanwhile, migrant workers did not all earn the ‘social rights’ that supposedly 
guaranteed worker citizens an acceptable exit from the cash nexus.83 Since the 
1990s (which is to say, during the period in which concerns about ‘modern slavery’ 
have grown), the pursuit of neo-liberal economic reforms has further diminished the 
populations that enjoy the protections once viewed as necessary to simultaneously 
accommodate a market in labour-power and the political fiction of universal 
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freedom and equality for non-commodifiable human subjects. In both the affluent 
and the developing world, social protections from the labour market have been 
eroded and/or made even more directly conditional on participation in paid 
employment, while the pursuit of ‘flexible’ labour markets through de-regulation 
and privatisation policies has loosened the constraints on employers’ abilities to 
treat labour power as a commodity like any other.84  
It is amongst the populations at the sharp end of these policies that many of those 
dubbed ‘modern slaves’ by the new abolitionists are to be found. What are 
described as ‘worst forms of child labour’, ‘bonded labour’, and ‘forced labour’ 
typically affect those who, lacking any and all social protection, accept work in the 
informal sectors that flourish under neo-liberal economic regimes. Because these 
sectors are non-unionised and unregulated, securing a decent employer who 
honours the terms of the contract and refrains from cheating, beating or otherwise 
abusing workers is a matter of luck.85 In some cases, the lack of social protection and 
inability to either quit or seek redress against a violent or abusive employer links to 
an illegalized immigration status, or for internal migrants, to an inability to access 
rights of citizenship. But to return to a point made earlier, authorized migrant 
workers can be equally vulnerable in the ‘hidden abode of production’. Immigration 
and employment law can operate in tandem to disadvantage workers, as is the case, 
for instance, for migrant domestic workers who are simultaneously forced into 
dependence on an employer-sponsor for their immigration status, and excluded 
from protections afforded to workers in other sectors under labour law. In fact, as a 
recent volume edited by Catherine Costello and Mark Freedland makes clear, 
migration law impacts on labour rights, and the regulation of migration increasingly 
impacts on employment and labour relations.86 Vulnerability to being treated as a 
‘thing’, in the sense of being controlled and used as but an instrument to further 
another’s ends, is not an inherent quality of individual migrants or workers, nor is it a 
necessary outcome of the commodification of labour power. It is legally, socially and 
politically constructed.  
In the case of both Atlantic slavery and wage labour, human beings or their capacity 
to labour are only represented as commodities for purposes of contractual exchange 
(and in the case of slavery, sometimes also accounting, taxation, securing credit, and 
so on). The commodity exchange does not literally make a ‘thing’ of the human 
being or their labour power, but rather initiates a hierarchical relationship between 
the slave or worker and the slaveholder or employer, and one in which the powers 
that can be exercised over the former by the latter are granted or limited by the 
state. The difference is that in the case of slavery, the moment of commodity 
exchange (which is to say the moment at which the human being was configured as 
a ‘thing’) was either made possible by, or led to, the attribution of slave status, with 
all that this implied in terms of her or his disfiguration as a ‘person’. 
Beyond the New Abolitionism  
Before making a concluding remark about the implications of the above discussion of 
the persons/things dichotomy for those who are today concerned about the coercive 
exploitation of people who see no choice but to remain in that appalling situation, 
there is another powerful and disturbing illustration of the double character of 
slaves in Atlantic slave societies to consider. In New Orleans in 1834, a fire broke out 
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at a mansion belonging to Dr Louis Lalaurie and his wife Delphine. Neighbours who 
arrived to assist broke into locked upper chambers where they discovered seven 
horrifically mutilated people. The victims were slaves belonging to the Lalauries, and 
Delphine Lalaurie was subsequently discovered to have tortured and murdered 
many more men, women and children. Since it graphically revealed the barbarity 
made possible by the institution of slavery, antislavery publications paid a great deal 
of attention to this case. What is more surprising, at least if we start from the 
assumption that slaves were legally constructed merely as things and socially 
regarded as dehumanized objects by slaveholding communities, is first, that 
Delphine Lelaurie violated Louisiana’s civil code on slavery in her treatment of her 
slave property, article 173, chapter 3 of which states that ‘”[t]he slave is entirely 
subject to the will of his maser who may correct and chastise him, though not with 
unusual rigor, nor so as to maim or mutilate him, or to expose him to the danger of 
loss life, or to cause his death”’;87 and second, judging from news reports of the 
case, it appalled white slaveholding society as much as antislavery thinkers. Indeed, 
free citizens of New Orleans, both white and ‘of colour’ were so outraged by the 
Lalauries’ depravity and the absence of any legal suit against them under this law, 
that they mounted the city’s first riot to exact revenge upon the Lalauries’ home.88  
Courtney Baker draws attention to the rioters’ symbolic rejection of the Louisiana 
1825 Civil Code, which ‘defines slaves as “immovables” akin to “[l]ands and 
buildings, or other constructions… [that] are immovable by their nature”’ and 
‘effected a reality in which enslaved persons “were bound by the same rules 
governing any transfer of real estate in the state”’. In their concerted efforts to 
destroy the mansion and its contents (the Lalauries had by then already fled New 
Orleans), Baker argues, the rioters ‘enacted a radical distinction between enslaved 
beings and immovable property’. However, we might equally say that this distinction 
already existed in the contradiction between the Civil Code’s construction of the 
slave as property, and of the slaveholder’s obligations to refrain from maiming, 
mutilating or murdering him or her. There was nothing in the same code to prevent 
a property holder from dismantling or otherwise destroying a building or other 
construction. The slave was simultaneously a person that was not fully figured as a 
person, and a thing that was not fully figured as a thing. Proslavery thinkers – in the 
main – wished to maintain that legal and social ambiguity. Its minimal 
acknowledgment of the humanity of the enslaved affirmed the humanity of the 
slaveholder. 
The relevance of this for discourse on contemporary ‘slavery’ becomes clear if we 
focus on the fact that, since states no longer attribute slave status, those who today 
find themselves trapped in situations of coercive exploitation generally find 
themselves in that position because they have been attributed one of the statuses 
that disfigure personhood in contemporary societies, or because the legal and social 
regimes surrounding the commodification of labour leave them unprotected, and/or 
because the interaction between the construction of both ‘persons’ and ‘things’ 
leaves them especially unable to assert the rights that others might claim as either 
citizens or workers. These legal exclusions and regimes do not automatically mean 
that any individual who falls foul of them will be denied wages, violently restrained, 
raped, or tortured by those who exploit their labour power. Just as there was a 
  19 
continuum of experience amongst the enslaved in the US historically, ranging for 
Ned Hyman’s at one end through to the victims of Delphine Lelaurie at the other, so 
today the experience of those who are refused full socially recognised personhood 
and/or protections within and against the labour market spans a wide spectrum. 
It is surely the case that politicians of all political hues are appalled by cases at the 
most violent and abusive end of this spectrum, the cases that new abolitionists use 
to publicise their cause. There is no reason to suspect that figures like Theresa May 
are unmoved by cases in which children or women suffer the kind of prolonged 
torture endured by 12 year old Maria, mentioned at the start of this article, for 
example. In fact, the moral outrage that leads May to characterise such cases as a 
‘barbaric evil’ that must be eliminated from society is doubtless as sincerely felt as 
was that of the many white slaveholders in New Orleans who expressed horror and 
disgust at Delphine Lalaurie’s sadistic and murderous violence against her slaves. The 
point, however, is that the latter could condemn particular individuals who took 
pleasure in torturing their slaves without also condemning the legal institution of 
slavery which, by giving the enslaved a bifurcated existence as both person and 
thing, left all slaves potentially vulnerable to such violation. Likewise, politicians like 
Theresa May can today pour moral condemnation upon individuals who take 
advantage of the powerlessness of their victims in order to subject them to the most 
egregious violence and exploitation, without also condemning the laws that 
disempower the victims. In fact, such politicians are frequently committed to 
strengthening the laws that strip workers of rights that protect their human worth 
when they commodify their labour power, and that disfigure many migrants as 
persons. Most ironic of all, the immigration and border controls that cost lives and 
create vulnerability are frequently justified as necessary to the task of combatting 
‘human trafficking and modern-day slavery’.89  
The new abolitionism, like the popular European abolitionist movement of the 
eighteenth century, mobilizes sentimental sympathy. The problem with such 
sentimentality, Lynne Festa notes, is that it operates on a selective basis, and ‘the 
subject produced by sentimental antislavery is granted only a diluted form of 
humanity grounded in pain and victimhood, a humanity that is only as enduring (or 
as fleeting) as the recognition of the metropolitan subject who bestows it’.90 Today’s 
new abolitionist organizations invite a privileged, mostly Western, audience to 
identify with those who would otherwise be regarded as racially, culturally, socially 
or sexually distant Others (the bonded brick kiln worker, the temple slave, the 
restavec, the migrant domestic worker, the prostitute) on the basis of their suffering. 
Again, this allows for highly selective forms of recognition. In relation to migration, 
for instance, the new abolitionists mobilize concern for the suffering of those 
deemed to be ‘victims of trafficking’, but not for the suffering of those migrants who 
die as a consequence of border controls, or who are locked into detention centres, 
or who are forcibly separated from children and loved ones by deportation.  
Moreover, when the suffering of the so-called ‘modern slave’ is abstracted from the 
legal, political and economic structures in which it takes place, we are left with a 
simple moral vision of a wicked individual ‘trafficker’ or ‘slaver’ who has reduced 
another human being to but a ‘thing’. Indeed, it is precisely because the ‘modern 
slave’ is imagined in abstraction from the structural inequalities that preserve the 
  20 
interests of the powerful and privileged that global political and business elites can 
happily bang the new abolitionist drum. Those who seriously wish to challenge the 
phenomena discussed under the heading ‘modern slavery’, as well as other, equally 
grave restraints on human freedom in the contemporary world, need to rethink the 
taken-for-granted assumption that slavery’s essential and unique wrongness lay in 
its reduction of persons to things. The more complicated and processual histories in 
which Atlantic world slavery simultaneously configured human beings as both 
person and thing, and neither person nor thing, have far greater relevance and much 
more important lessons for such a political project. 
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